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STRUCTURING IMPARTIALITY IN INTERNATIONAL
THIRD-PARTY LAWMAKING
THOMAS M. FRANCK t

To what extent can impartial third-party decision-making play a
meaningful role in disputes between states? The question is scarcely a
new one and its age is perhaps exceeded only by that of the familiar
answer: that in most international quarrels the legal merits "have nothing
to do with the case," that political issues cannot yield to litigious proceedings. The contention is succinctly illustrated by Professor Julius Stone:
The current Soviet-Western dispute concerning Berlin, for
example, could seemingly be reduced to a series of legal questions
eminently suitable for adjudication by the International Court.
Some of these would be: What is the extent of any obligation
of the USSR to permit traffic of German personnel and goods
between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin
under the Jessup-Malik agreement of 1949? What limits, if
any, are there to the Soviet obligation to permit Allied military
(a) rail, (b) motor vehicle, or (c) air communications between
West Germany and West Berlin? This would have some nice
sub-questions about an alleged agreement based on correspondence of 1945 that was not replied to, although it was apparently
acted upon; an alleged agreement by practice; and alternatively
an agreement arising from technical day-to-day agreements
reached in committees of the Kommandatura, especially the Committee on Air Travel. Further, what rights of passage, if any,
did the Western Powers or the Federal Republic acquire under
customary international law concerning ways of necessity to enclaved territory? Is the Soviet Union entitled under international
law to transfer to the German Democratic Republic the legal responsibility for performance of its obligations with respect to
Western access to West Berlin?'
Stone maintains that adjudication would produce answers "rather distant
from the realities of the dispute as seen by the states in conflict" and that
the "real concerns of Moscow and Washington would not be before the
Court at all." 2 Their real concern would be with Realpolitik: Berlin as
t Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
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the "show-window of the West," Russia's desire to wrest recognition for
East Germany from the West, and so on. Thus, the court's answers,
being given to the legal rather than the political questions, would be of
little value in settling the dispute. Indeed, its decision might make
matters considerably worse.
Noting such conflicts as those over the right of passage of Israeli
ships through the Suez Canal, and the India-China border dispute, Stone
concludes that the world "is veritably plagued with disputes threatening
the peace which could in theory be submitted to the International Court
or to arbitral settlement. The reasons why they threaten peace are likely
to be the very reasons why the disputants regard them as non-justiciable;
and the judgment or award is as likely to aggravate as it is to mitigate the
intransigence of the situation for at least one disputant state." 3 In
other words, a decision based upon law and made in response to legally
framed issues will generally not only be unresponsive to the real or
"political" problem, but cannot be enforced against the loser. While
such decisions harden the victor with false faith that his case has somehow been strengthened or even vindicated, that attitude hinders settlement by negotiation.
In substance Professor Stone's point is that certain kinds of disputes, indeed most important international disputes, are really political
and not legal at all-that legal arguments merely obfuscate and do not
get at the political heart of the matter which can only be reached by
political methods. His position implies that there are certain types of
disputes which are by nature inappropriate to settlement by third-party
decision-making. Such a thesis contradicts the postulate that all disputes should initially be subject to two-party methods of conciliation and
negotiation, but that any dispute unresolved in this way is appropriately
the subject for an impartial decision. The question can best be settled
by attempting to prove that there are certain disputes which are
inherently political, and for which a third-party legal solution would be
the wrong answer.
I.

ARE CERTAIN DISPUTES INHERENTLY UNYIELDING TO
THIRD-PARTY DECISION-MAKING?

What is a "political dispute" that the courts must shun it?
have been many attempts at definition, one of which was applied
ly in the case concerning whether special costs incurred in the
Nations' Suez and Congo operations could be assessed against
3. Id. at 9.

There
recentUnited
all the
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members in the same way as ordinary dues.4 In his dissent, the Soviet
Union's Judge Koretsky insisted that the International Court should
refuse to decide:
Political issues [have in this case] prevailed over juridical
considerations. First and foremost we have there a political
question, the question of financial policy in peace-keeping
matters and, connected with it, a question of the powers and
responsibilities of the principal organs of the United Nations,
the political essence of which can hardly be denied. As the
political aspect of the question posed to the Court is the prevailing one, the Court, to my mind, ought to avoid giving an
answer on the substance and ought not to find unwillingly that
its opinion may be used as an instrument of political struggle.
I think there are "compelling reasons" for not giving an
answer .... 5
Can an issue have a "political essence?" "Judicial accidents?" Surely
there is nothing "essentially" or inherently "political" about financial
policy, particularly not in the context of an allegedly ultra vires peacekeeping operation, and, e.g., surely not any more than in a business
scheme to destroy competition and fix prices. Are the anti-trust laws
"legal" or "political?" Could it be that in Russia all fiscal policy,
having been concentrated in the hands of government, is "political" in
the sense that it is beyond the reach of law? Surely not.
Of course all really important laws, as well as all landmark judgments of courts, are "political" in that they address themselves to major
issues of policy. But that means very little. The cavalier use of the
"political disputes" rationale has drawn the eloquent ire of Judge Lauterpacht who characterizes it as "a well-meant attempt to lend the
authority of a legal principle to an attitude of States inimicable to any
recognition of the sovereignty of law." 6 He points out, "The State is
a political institution and all questions which affect it as a whole, in
particular its relations with other States, are therefore political. As
such, they are deemed to be important. 7 But if all "political" or
"important" matters were removed from the calendar of the International Court, this "would mean a speedy and radical liquidation of the
4.
[1962]
5.
6.
(1933).
7.

Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Art. 17, para. 2, of the Charter),
I.C.J. Rep. 151.
Id. at 254.
LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION

Id. at 153.
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activities of the Court."8 Certainly, if "important" issues are inherently
inappropriate for adjudication, the nations of the world have burdened
the third-party process with a remarkable preponderance of the inappropriate. The Honduras-Nicaraguan, Holland-Belgian, British-French,
Thailand-Cambodian, and British-Norwegian litigation before the World
Court, not to mention numerous arbitrations, all concerned disputes over
ownership of undeniably "important" tracts of land or sea.' In some
cases, as in the Honduras-Nicaraguan dispute, thousands of square
miles have been at stake. In others, such as the case concerning the
ancient Temple of Preah Vihar, the prize has been one of great sentimental value. It is certainly true that in the past two decades more
boundary disputes have been settled by adjudication or arbitration than
by negotiation or conquest. Yet, there are few matters more fraught
with "political essence" or of greater national importance.
Professor Hans Kelsen has cut through the "political dispute"
mystique with incisive clarity. The legal or political character of a dispute depends on the nature of the norms to be applied in the settlement,
and not on the nature of subject matter of the dispute as the traditional
doctrine seems to assume. "A dispute is a legal dispute if it is to be
settled by the application of legal norms . . . just as a Christmas tree
is a tree decked like one, be it fir, cedar, or plastic fiber."'" Furthermore,
If the statement that a political dispute is not justiciable means
only that it cannot be settled by the decision of an international
tribunal, then every dispute is not justiciable if the parties do
not agree to submit it to a tribunal competent to settle it in
accordance with existing international law. If, however, the
statement that a dispute is not justiciable means that existing
international law cannot be applied to it because of the very
nature of the dispute, then there is no dispute which is not
justiciable."
While it is not necessary to maintain that all disputes are equally
amenable to judicial process, it is readily observable from current usage
of the term "political dispute" that it does not define an identifiable
category of disputes. It merely restates what is or is not being done
8. Id. at 155.

9. Honduras-Nicaraguan: Case Concerning the Arbitral Award Made by the King
of Spain, [1960] I.C.J. Rep. 249; Holland-Belgian: Case Concerning Sovereignty Over
Certain Frontier Land, [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 236; British-French: The Minquiers and
Ecrehos Case, [1953] I.CJ. Rep. 130; Thailand-Cambodia: The Temple of Preah Vihar
Case, [1962] I.C.J. Rep. 260; British-Norweigian: Fisheries Case, [1951] I.CJ. Rep. 83.
10.

KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 381-82 (1952).

11. Ibid.
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about solving a dispute and is of no help in deciding what to do, except
as an excuse for perpetuating the status quo. In essence it is a device
for perpetuating political hegemony, as distinguished from the rule of
law, in the domain of international settlement. Thus used, the concept
of the "political" dispute is of no value in selecting those cases which
ought not be litigated from those which should, although there is nothing
wrong with describing a dispute as "political" so long as the term is
used solely as description and not as prescription.2
II.

WHICH DISPUTES ARE AMENABLE TO THE JUDICIAL PROCESS?

If no logical test can be found for treating certain disputes as unyielding to third-party settlement, it does not necessarily follow that
every dispute not resolved by the parties themselves should be determined by a court of law. Adjudication is only one method by which the
services of impartial third-parties can be brought to bear, and courts
are not always the most suitable forum for settlement. What is necessary is a reasoned examination of the types of issues which require
settlement in a non-third-party forum. That analysis, however, is itself
a part of the judicial function to make reasoned use of the court's right
hand to operate the scales of justice and of its left hand to stay, upon
occasion, its right.
When the British judges of the court of equity exercised their
discretion to refuse jurisdiction over an issue, they tried to reason and
explain why a petitioner was not to be allowed to plead his case. The
shorthand for these explanations is by now well formulated: the petitioner did not come before the court "with clean hands," or he assumed
his risks as a "volunteer," or the court feels itself unable to provide an
effective remedy. If certain types of disputes should not be decided
by international courts because the judicial remedy is somehow inappropriate, then it is for those courts similarly to develop a reasoned
jurisprudence of abstention in accordance with an analytical and consistent theory of their function and jurisdiction. And it is for the
judges to apply the tests so devised to each dispute which falls within
12. The national legal system still reflects the same fuzziness. The Supreme Court
of the United States has on a number of occasions refused to decide an issue simply

because it was "political" as if that were a sufficient reason in itself. The most notable
instance was the refusal, now reversed, to consider the "political" question whether
legislative districts must be of roughly equal population to comply with the constitutional
guarantee of "equal protection" for the voter. One can therefore scarcely manifest the
shock reserved for exposure to an unfamiliar human frailty when judge Koretsky tries
to invoke the same formula. But the fact that the Supreme Court has sometimes laced
its candor with formal polemic is no excuse, much less an example, for the International
Court. For example, compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) with Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223-24 (1962).
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their jurisdictional option because the parties have been unable to devise
a solution.
A workable formula for determining when a dispute is unsuitable
to judicial determination is not readily laid to hand. Attempts to
devise one have occupied generations of international legal philosophers
with indifferent success." The majority of states have not accepted
the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court under Article
36(2) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 4 Some of
those which also provide useful, contemporary definitions of jurisdiction by expressly excluding from the purview of the court such matters
as disputes between members of a familial grouping of states (e.g., the
British Commonwealth), and disputes as to territorial status, national
security or particular treaties or events. These may roughly be grouped
as disputes for which the parties have themselves made settlement provision and disputes concerning "essential matters."
No particular significance attaches to the first category, so long as
the alternative procedure meets the minimal standards of good public
order. It is the "important" or "essential" matter which affects "national security" or "national honor" that has provided the philosophers,
and the International Court of Justice with the substance of most objection to adjudication and which has traditionally been the real significance
of the meaningless term "political dispute." He who believes that a court
should not determine political matters usually means, if anything at all,
that a court should not decide anything of real importance to either or
both of the litigants.
He may simply mean, however, a dispute in which one of the
13. LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 6-21.
14. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they

recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to
any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all
legal disputes concerning: (a) the interpretation of a treaty; (b) any question
of international law; (c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would
constitute a breach of an international obligation; (d) the nature of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation.
STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 36(2).
By July 16, 1962, the following states had deposited declarations accepting the
compulsory jurisdiction: Australia, Belgium, Cambodia, Canada, China, Columbia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Finland, France, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Israel, Japan, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Somalia, South Africa,
Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Republic (Egypt), United Kingdom, United
States of America, Uruguay. See [1962-1963] I.C.J.Y.B. 237-59. The declaration of
the United Arab Republic is that dated July 18, 1957, regarding the operation of the
Suez Canal, and is not a general acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction, as are the
others. See ROSENNE, THrE WORLD CoURT 96 (1962). More recently, Uganda has accepted
compulsory jurisdiction.
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parties is wrong in law but believes the law to be wrong. Professor
Corbett explores the philosophical potential of this argument: where
"what one party is demanding, and will go on demanding, is a change
in the existing position," there is "some justification for classifying as
'non-legal,' 'political,' or 'nonjusticiable,' [such] disputes which cannot
be substantially disposed of without a change in the legal position."'"
In support of dispensation of cases involving a dispute not as to the
law but the wisdom of the law, Professor Corbett reminds us that,
within the state structure, the losing litigant may try to rally sufficient
political support to bring about a legislative change in the law while in
the international community such a remedy is not generally available.
Yet, are the citizen-litigant's opportunities for reversing a court by
legislation really better than a state's chances of reversing a court by
treaty or convention? And besides, why is a litigant before the International Court, any more than one before the Supreme Court of the
United States, precluded from urging a judicial reconstruction of an
unjust, inappropriate or obsolete precedent? Also, if there really is a
relative paucity of decided international case law, then the judge is in a
particularly favorable position to do right without being led by the
"dead hand of precedent," especially since the International Court is not
even formally bound by its prior decisions."
Might it not better be argued that legal reform in the light of
evolving circumstance is more likely to receive a sympathetic hearing in
the cool detachment of a court of law than in the heat and pressure of
a legislative chamber? Certainly the cause of constitutional reform in
the area of civil liberties has had far more assistance from the United
States Supreme Court in recent decades than from the United States
Congress. Courts, freed of weighed majorities, unanimity rules, committee chairmen, filibusters or any of the delaying and retrenching procedures which sometimes characterize legislatures are, in fact, well organized to consider and effect intelligent reform. But it is not necessary to answer the question, for in international as in national affairs,
the two methods exist side by side, allowing the reformer some latitude
to select his recourse. A bad decision by an international court can be
repealed by multi-lateral treaty or convention. Moreover, in international even more than national law, a widely unacceptable judicial determination may sometimes tend to be ignored in practice rather than
enforced.
15.

16.

CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATION OF STATES 78
STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 59.

(1951).
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These efforts to define the limits of adjudicability are praiseworthy
in that they represent attempts to devise a more meaningful formula for
judicial abstention than is apparent in the bold phrase "political dispute."
Yet, they are unsatisfactory in that they employ special pleading to
explain a readily-observed phenomenon: not the "political" quality of
the dispute but the nature of the disputant who will not litigate, especially the powerful state. To neutralize that familiar but frustrating
obstacle, the international lawyer summons his tape measure and saw to
cut a hole in the court's jurisdiction that will allow the obstacle to pass,
no matter how offensive this may be to the symmetry of logic. He
might better summon historical perspective. The Supreme Court of
the United States had to wait fully fifty years after its birth before the
average annual number of cases submitted to it rose from 10 to 70.
Some forty years later, its annual docket bulged with 1,500 applications
to litigate." The International Court, too, needs patience and time.
More, it needs reform that will attract customers. Instead, it is offered
theories which would simply classify as "political" and "non-justiciable"
the sorts of things the consumers have been refusing to buy: "important"
issues, issues where they know the law to be against them, and so on.
To elevate the patterns of national resistance against law to law is to
avoid rape by consenting to be ravished.
Surely it is the important issues and the issues in which a recalcitrant knows the law to be against his immediate interest (as distinguished from long-range or real interests to which he may for the moment be blind) which are most in need of judicial intervention when
two-party lawmaking fails. In the wise words of Professor Lauterpacht, "It is impossible, in a scheme of things devised to secure the
reign of law, to provide machinery calculated to enable a state to disregard the law in a manner binding upon the party which is willing to
abide by the law."" Likewise, Professor Corbett agrees that there
would be little respect for the law if the courts were to be heard to tell
a litigant, "We are sorry, but it is clear to us that your opponent is not going to accept a judicial determination of your respective rights as a settlement of this case. We therefore refuse to try it."" It is less the role of
lawyer-publicist to create a judicial structure according to the lowest
specifications of existing conduct than to plan a structure that will
encourage growth and development.
17.
18.

HAnXARSKJOLD, JURISDICTION INTERNATIONALE SYTHOFF
LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 372-73.

19.

CoRBETT, op. cit. supra note 15, at 79.

355 (1938).
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Judicial abdication there must be; not every case posed to a court
need be decided by a court. But the test must not be whether the issue
is too "hot" to handle, too difficult or too "important." It should be
whether some better alternative method of settlement can be found in
the instant case, that is, whether the judicial remedy is inappropriate
as judged solely by the standards of good order, creation and problem
solving. The test ought not be whether the issue is too big, or the
defendant too stubborn, but whether the question posed is one which a
court is properly equipped to answer. The word merits stressing: to
"answer," not to "enforce." In deciding whether to decide, a court
must look to the issues and not to the clients. It must not be swayed by
the power, sensitivity or bellicosity of the parties; otherwise it is not a
court worthy of the name.
To evolve such a test requires a re-examination of the third-party
lawmaking function. Professor Lon Fuller has had occasion to approach
a comparable question, the role of the arbitrator in collective bargaining
between unions and employers, by venturing the following working
definition: the "adjudicative process [is] a process of decision characterized by a particular form of participation accorded to the affected
party, that of presenting proofs and arguments for a decision in his
favor."2 What are courts all about? What are judges, lawyers, witnesses, plaintiffs and defendants all doing in their assigned roles and
even their assigned positions in the courtroom? Third-party lawmaking,
its particular genius, encourages both parties to a dispute to construct
rival cathedrals of contention supported by massive flying buttresses of
evidence and thrusting aloft towering spires of logic, thus presenting a
neutral third party with the most dramatically clear and evident choice
possible: "yes" or "no;" "'right" or ('wrong;" "win!' or "lose." The
onus is on the parties to construct the choice, to be the principal mover in
the process. The court must watch and, at the end, choose. According
to Professor Fuller, "the question then becomes, in what kinds of cases
can this participation be meaningful?" This is the "basic question of
the kinds of problems that are amenable to solution by the adjudicative
process.""
The simple "yes or no" issue that falls most squarely within the
competence of third-party decision-making is illustrated by the BrazilianFrench "Lobster War." A treaty to which both states are parties pro20. Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, in

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

AND THE ARBITRATOR'S ROLE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FFENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
NATiONA
AcADmY OF ARBITRATORS 8, 37 (1962).

21. Ibid.
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vides that every nation shall have jurisdiction over the continental shelf
which extends beyond its territorial waters to a certain depth. Such jurisdiction shall not, however, give it the right to control navigation, fisheries
or any other activity save for "exploiting its natural resources." Natural
resources are defined by the treaty as "mineral and other non-living resources of the sea-bed and subsoil together with living organisms belonging to sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the sea,-bed or are unable
to move except in constant physical contact with the sea-bed or subsoil."22
A disagreement has arisen concerning lobster fishing by French ships on
the Brazilian continental shelf. Brazil has ordered the French to leave
and has arrested some French ships. Claiming to be merely "fishing"
for lobsters, the French sent a destroyer. Are lobsters fish, or are they
"sedentary species ?" A court is splendidly equipped to answer such a
question, after hearing expert evidence on the locomotive proclivities of
lobsters and, perhaps, evidence on the state of mind of the negotiators of
the treaty, if not of the lobsters themselves. It is even conceivable that
other interested states might ask to be heard on the larger economic implications of the issue. But, in the end, the court need only say "yes" or
"no," although it is unlikely to deprive the parties of the privilege of a
more elaborate exposition. Courts, in other words, are excellent at "truefalse" exams, competent at answering "multiple-choice" questions, but
generally not prepared for essay-type tests.
Obviously the interpretation of treaties is most frequently going to
face courts with issues stated in clear alternatives because treaties constitute a narrowing of the issues by the parties. The court is limited to the
relatively clear, simple choice of whether lobsters are "fish" or "sedentary," because the dozens of other issues which otherwise might go to
make up a lobster war-the status and scope of a "continental shelf," the
right to exploit "traditional" fishing grounds, conservation versus exploitation, strategic considerations-have been removed from the dispute
by the agreement of the parties to the treaty. Indeed, it is the parties who
have agreed that all species be either sedentary or not. Absent such an
agreement there might have been a hundred categories of various degrees
of sedentariness. In this important sense, international legislation helps
courts to function by narrowing the issues the court must decide, and not
merely or primarily by telling the court what the law is.
Issues perfectly suited for adjudication do, however, present themselves in a non-treaty, "common-law" context. For example, consider
22.

Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/CoNF. 13/L. 55.
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an international lawsuit resulting from a collision on the high seas of two
ships operating under rival codes of signals. One uses a green light to
port, the other starboard. Neither is party to a relevant treaty. Which
is wrong? A court would no doubt examine evidence presented by the
parties as to which is the older, the prevailing, the more widely followed
custom. But the substance of the dispute scarcely matters; the important
thing, no doubt the overriding reason for taking the case to litigation at
all, is to settle finally the question of shipboard directional signals-to
get a clear and final "yes" or "no." To the community at large it matters
little which way the court decides; the decision is the thing.
What makes a judicial determination of the status of lobsters and
nautical signals relatively easy for a court is the duality of choice. Only
two solutions are possible; there is no undistributed middle ground, no
complex web of inter-relation. A simple adversary system is thus likely
to yield excellent results. But what if there are three possible solutions,
or ten, or a thousand? In 1962 Britain undertook to transfer three
British colonial possessions, including North Borneo, to the Federation of
Malaysia. Relying upon the claim of the Sultan of Sulu, the Philippines
maintained that North Borneo should revert to her. Indonesia, on the
other hand, urged that the principles of territorial integrity should operate
to unite North Borneo with Indonesia's island of Borneo. Certain nationalist leaders of North Borneo and neighboring Brunei and Sarawak
claimed that the principles of self-determination entitled them to complete independence. Had such a dispute come before the International
Court, it would have necessitated the interpretation of treaties, resolutions
of the General Assembly and customary international law, a task the
court is well-equipped to execute. The fact that feelings of the parties
might be running high, that the issue is one of great importance to most
of the states involved, and that the parties are of unequal size and power
should not divert the court from its determination to go about its business. On the other hand, this dispute obviously did not present a simple
choice between two possible contentions strongly urged by two contending parties. Here there were five contenders, each urging a different solution. Since each contender in an adversary proceeding must meet the
case of each of the others, there would have been not two but twenty
alternatives being argued before the court.23 This, in itself, may not stop
a court. But the nature of the subject-matter might also involve dearly
23. Indonesia would have had to answer and present a better case than Britain, the
Philippines, Malaya and the North Borneo Nationalists. Britain would have had to meet
the arguments of Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines and the North Borneo Nationalists,
and so on.
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discernible problems of preference. Despite its claim to annex, the Philippines might actually have preferred the territory to be independent, but
felt her case to be legally stronger than that of the advocates of selfdetermination. The North Borneo nationalists, if they thought that they
were going to lose, might have preferred the territory to go to Indonesia
rather than to Malaya. All five parties might have preferred North
Borneo to be under United Nations rule for a time, like West Irian, rather
than see it go directly to any of the other contenders. Or a partition,
buffer-zone or condominium might have been mutually agreeable. Unfortunately, none of these preferences could be expressed in the adversary
process of a court nor could they be weighed by judges.
A court can decide such a twenty-sided case, though a decision is not
always a solution. In a British-Netherlands agreement of 1654 it was
stipulated that if the arbitrators had not reached an agreement by a certain day they should "be shut up in a room separate from all other persons, without fire, candle, meat, drink, or other support, till they have
agreed." 2 4 Today we would prefer to proceed more circumspectly, for it
is realized that a judicial decision reached simply for the sake of resolving
a dispute may be fine for problems involving nautical signals but not for
the future of North Borneo.
The "North Borneo-type" problem illustrates what Dr. Polanyi has
called "polycentric" 2 and Professor Fuller "many-centered" issues.26 It
is many-centered in the sense that it cannot be adequately laid to rest by
a simple "yes" or "no" answer based upon the maximal polar arguments
of both sides. Not only are there many alternatives before the court,
there are many alternatives before the parties, some of which they may
not have even discovered. With so many moving parts, the case has a
potential flexibility which may facilitate a solution different from any of
the maximum contentions put forward by the parties, or one incorporating parts of all of them. This flexibility is not generally best exploited
by a court of law; it calls forth a different sort of institutional, structural
or procedural genius, yet one not depriving the clients of the third-party
function.
Refer to Professor Stone's example of the Berlin dispute as a typical
"political" issue and assume it came before an international court.2 7

It

would be relatively simple to decide that, "yes," the London Agreement
of September 2, 1944,28 is still in effect; that, "yes," the November 22,
24.

HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 52 (1944).

25. POLANYI, THE LOGIC OF LIBERTY 170-84 (1951).
26. See Fuller, supra note 20.
27. See text accompanying note 1 supra.
28. London Agreement, Sept. 2, 1944, 227 U.N.T.S. 279, 286, 297.
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1945, memorandum of approval by the Allied Control Council of three
air corridors was a binding international agreement, and that, "yes," access had been confirmed by the May 4, 1949, agreement ending the Soviet
blockade.29 While such questions and answers are ideal for adjudication,
how far do they advance us towards a viable solution to the Berlin dispute? The court could have established that allied traffic into Berlin, of
undefined quantity and quality, has been sanctioned by Soviet agreement.
It might even determine whether the Soviet obligations could be unilaterally transferred to another authority such as the government of East
Germany. But thereafter the questions become more nearly insoluble by
a court. How much traffic must be allowed? What kind of planes may
be used? And what cargoes may the planes carry? Does the right of
passage preclude all control? If not, how much control is excessive?
May Soviet military maneuvers take precedence over allied civilian traffic? These are the real issues which arise between the allies and the Soviets in the day-to-day operations of the Berlin occupation and the application of the access accords. It is very doubtful whether the World Court,
for example, could usefully be drawn into these bottomless quicksands of
day-to-day administration. A special administrative tribunal set up expressly for that purpose might usefully supplement a system of negotiation and conciliation, whereas a formal and nonspecialized forum like the
International Court of Justice would be an extremely cumbersome ordercreating mechanism for this purpose. A blockade could be made quite
effective by simply requiring the right of passage of every plane, barge,
bus and truck be established by time-consuming litigation before a world
court.
The adversary process of a court of law is best suited to disputes in
which there are a limited number of questions that are dispositive of the
dispute, each of which can be posed in terms of two clear alternatives.
The process is least amenable to an issue which by virtue of its complexity
is better regarded as a matter of degree or synthesis, or in which the
number of questions to be answered is not limited. Courts are not generally well-equipped to determine questions of degree or to effect synthesis-especially the International Court, under-equipped as it is in pretrial procedures, or such devices as juries, assessors, or even the
compromis by which the parties distill the essence of the case for the
tribunal.
Boundary disputes best illustrate the problem of issue-framing. Any
court can answer a straightforward question like: "Does the boundary
29.

DEP'T STATE BULL.

631 (May 15, 1949).
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follow the St. Croix River?"

Given a limited number of options, it

might even field such an inquiry as "Which river is the St. Croix?" The
United States Supreme Court 0 and the International Court in recent cases
between Honduras and Nicaragua,3 Belgium and Netherlands (1959),"
and Cambodia and Thailand (1962)" have done so with success. But
the success of the court's work in boundary cases depends upon there being a clearly discernible and limited number of factors which are exhaustive or determinative. Such a limitation may be imposed by the parties
through prior agreement, or by the court's applying legal precedent.
Where no such limitations are imposed, the work of impartial determination becomes difficult within the formal framework of a court of law.
If the boundary is not at the St. Croix River, then where is it? Court
solution of the dispute would be unsatisfactory to the parties and harmful
to its image of impartiality. The court would not be equipped to designate the determinative factors, e.g., the wishes of the inhabitants, the
topography, contiguity, the flow of the rivers or climate. Before a case
is truly justiciable, that is, before it is subject to adversary process, there
must be agreement as to the controlling factors: "what the case is all
about." A court can answer boundary questions framed in specific alternatives; it cannot go over vast uncharted and disputed tracts with a judicial divining rod.
In proceedings before an arbitral tribunal this agreement takes the
form of a compromis which structures the issues for determination. Most
arbitration treaties bind the parties to negotiate such an "agreement on
the disagreement." The World Court, too, insists on a clearly framed
set of issues, since before the court will hear a case "diplomatic negotiations between the parties must have been carried to the point of a mutual
confrontation of their opposing views."34 Where no such confrontation
can be arrived at by the parties, the court may be able to help by eliminating those factors which by precedent, treaty, custom or even world public
policy have been deemed clearly irrelevant. Yet where the parties do not
agree and the court is insufficiently assisted by ascertainable principles of
factor-exclusion, it may wisely refuse to be drawn into unframed
litigation.
30. North Carolina v. Tennessee, 235 U.S. 1 (1914).
31. Case Concerning the Aribitral Award Made by the King of Spain, [1960] I.C.J.
Rep. 249.
32. Case Concerning Sovereignty Over Certain Frontier Lands, [1959] I.C.J. Rep.

236.

33. The Temple of Preah Vihar Case, [1962] I.CJ. Rep. 260.
34. HuDsoN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 84, citing the court's failure to entertain,
for lack of such confrontation, a claim advanced by Belgium against Bulgaria in the

Electricity Company Case, P.C.I.J., ser. E., No. 15, at 98-104 (1938-1939).
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An example of an issue which "is not a repository of judicially
manageable standards" 5 can be supplied by the stalled disarmament negotiations. Suppose the nations agreed to circumvent the inspection issue
by including in their agreement a clause to the effect that there shall be
"cas many inspections as are deemed necessary to the purposes of this
agreement, as determined, in the event of disagreement among the parties,
by the International Court of Justice." Thereafter, a dispute arises in
which the United States disagrees with a Soviet contention that an irspection of Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is "necessary to the purposes of the
agreement." How would the court handle such a dispute? "Necessary"
according to what perceivable standard? "Necessary" in the light of
what agreed factors? The number of variables makes such an issue not
merely polycentric but "infinicentric." It is a case a court might rightly
shun, insisting instead that the number of inspections, or at least a set of
standards by which the necessity of inspection may be determined, be
specified by political negotiation. Nevertheless, in the absence of specific
international legislation, courts can yet frequently proclaim law by reference to the public intent of the international community, though the public intent cannot be determined where the parties have not even agreed on
the nature of the issue between them, or where the failure to isolate the
nature of a dispute indicates a lack of any common Weltanschauung. By
leaving to court determination whether there shall be inspection without
the benefit of any standards, the disarmament agreement is less an agreement than evidence of a fundamental inability to agree. Generally, courts
ought not attempt to rise above such lack of agreement by fabricating
and imposing on the parties the common intent which they in fact do not
have.
The World Court has on occasion taken just this attitude. In the
Case Concerning Certain German Interestsin Upper Silesia of 1926,30 the
judges accepted jurisdiction but rejected the plaintiff's petition that they
inform Poland that its treatment of German assets was unlawful, and,
moreover, that they instruct the Poles as to the minimal requirements of
legal conduct. In effect, petitioner asked the court not only to determine
specifically whether a given course of conduct was illegal, but also to prescribe a legal course of conduct in general terms. In justifying their reLusal to grant the petition, the judges declared that "the claimant had
failed to formulate definite claims calculated to establish the character of
the conclusion in question as an application for a judgment on the point
35.
56.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962)
P.C.I.J., ser. E., No. 2, at 99-136 (1926).

(Brennan,

3.).

STRUCTURING IMPARTIALITY
at issue."' 7" To return to an earlier simile, the question whether conduct
X is legal can be compared to a "true-false" question, while an attempt
to define what constitutes legal conduct would resemble an essay. Similarly, in the Guardianship of Infants Case of 1958 between the Netherlands and Sweden,3" the court itself reformulated and narrowed the issue
as it emerged from the pleadings of the litigants in such a way as to
eliminate the broadly polycentric issue of ordre pmblic (loosely defined
as public policy) by substituting a simple "yes" or "no"' proposition of
statutory interpretation. It is, of course, likewise not at all unusual for
a United States court to refuse to answer a broad question posed by a
litigant in favor of a narrower one framed by the judges.
While the International Court probably does not technically have the
authority to refuse to decide a litigious case on the ground that its polycentricity precludes effective adjudication, it can and has refused to render an advisory opinion in the Eastern Carelia Case 9 because it did not
consider the issue appropriate. A wider discretion on the part of the
court to refuse to determine a case would be helpful if there were functionally more suitable methods of third-party intervention available in
situations where two-party lawmaking has failed but where formal adjudication does not offer the best possible recourse to third-party law.
The dispute which is "political" in the sense that it is inappropriate to
the judicial method of settlement may yet yield to some other form of
third-party intervention. It is for the international lawyer to devise such
methods of settlement which utilize the impartiality syndrome without
necessarily taking the adversary form.

III.

THIRD-PARTY INTERVENTION:

SOME ALTERNATIVES TO

FORMAL ADJUDICATION

What structural form such alternatives should take is a subject for
extensive further research, the outlines of which can only be sketched
here. Courts themselves can, of course, perform various functions which
do not feature the adversary process but which nevertheless involve a
third-party function. In the Behring Sea Arbitrationof 1892-1893," the
American-British arbitral tribunal not only solved a specific dispute but
acceded to the parties' request to draft a set of regulations governing all
sorts of future exigencies. A Greek-Turkish tribunal in 1897 actually
37. This assessment is by the clerk of the court. HAMMARSKJOLD, op. cit. supra note
17, at 78.

38. [1958] I.C.J. Rep. 210.
39. P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 5 (1923).
40.

HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 125.
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drafted a text for a consular convention after negotiation had failed."'
In 1910 another British-American tribunal, in the North Atlantic Fisheries Case,42 also drafted a set of rules to govern future conduct. These
are, however, very exceptional extra-judicial activities for a court.
The International Court is authorized to decide issues not according
to law but ex aequo et bono-that is, on the basis of right and merit. 3
The ex aequo et bono power has never been used, although it has been
proposed by Guatemala in the Belize dispute. One may, however, turn
to domestic law for a demonstration. In describing, for example, the
work of India's Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Disputes Act of
1947, Mr. Justice Mukherjea of the Supreme Court of India contended
that:
In a judicial proceeding the judge has got to apply to the facts
found the law of the land which is fixed and uniform. The
quasi-judicial tribunal on the other hand gives its decision on
the differences between the parties not in accordance with fixed
rules of law but on principles of administrative policy or convenience or what appears to be just and proper in the circumstances of a particular case.44
Special tribunals like the Industrial Tribunal of India and not the regularly constituted courts generally exercise such powers. Various international tribunals have also been given power to decide in this way." The
failure of the International Court to find customers for its ex aequo et
bono services-available only if both parties to a dispute agree-may indicate that it offers the worst of both worlds: broadly unframed litigation confined to narrow adversary procedures. A more informal system
of justice warrants a more informal adjudicative structure than the
World Court or most arbitral tribunals can provide. Besides, there is
something unacceptable about requiring the judges of an established,
formal court to draw a line between their search for the law and a search
for right and fairness. Just as law suffers from being set apart from
fairness, so fairness suffers from being counterposed to philosophical consistency. There is something slightly distasteful about the notion that a
court might "if it deems such a course desirable .

.

.

go outside the

bounds of law [and equity] to reach a decision on objective grounds of
41. Id. at 80.
42. Id. at 125.
43. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 38, para. 2.
44. Bharat Bank v. Bbarat Bank Employees, [1950] S.C.R. 459, 508 (Sup. Ct.
India 1950).
45. LAUTERPACHT, op. cit. supra note 6, at 41.
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fair dealing and good faith."46 It presupposes, rather old-fashionedly,
that there are objective standards of fair dealing and good faith which
a court of law might reasonably be expected to ignore in favor of some
word-formula from the ancient past. Surely, if law is a form of philosophical, as distinguished from mechanical, consistency, then fairness is
incorporated into it by right reason and courageous pleading. There
may, of course, be instances where parties might wish to free themselves
of past mutual legal undertakings and resolve a dispute as if those undertakings did not exist. That purpose might be served by ex aequo et bono
litigation, but possible illustrations do not come readily to mind since the
past conduct of the parties is generally an essential and beneficial part of
the pleadings. More readily, perhaps, one shares the suspicion alluded to
by Judge Hudson that ex aequo et bono is a device for "adding up the
claims on both sides of a dispute and dividing the sum by two." 7 There
may well be occasions when a dispute can be solved in just this way, or
when it is desirable to have decisions made which are wholly consistent
with a political or administrative policy-one which may change from
day-to-day in response to trial and error. But again, courts are probably
not the best forum for that sort of work. In our domestic experience, we
have found it more functional to create so-called independent administrative agencies like the National Labor Relations Board, and, in an earlier
era, separate courts of equity. The same men should not be asked to be
experts both in impartiality and in a particular partiality. And the adversary structure is not necessarily best suited to a different kind of lawmaking, even one which remains loosely within the impartiality syndrome.
Some of the instruments of compulsory or assisted settlement which
may be evolved to round out the armory of international third-party
problem-solving ought to so modulate the third-party element that the
coercive factor is disguised. Some ought to functionally synthesize elements of two-party and third-party lawmaking. Indeed, such a synthesis
can already be observed in the postwar development of neutral states with
a preponderance of voting power in the United Nations General Assembly and with important roles in many international conferences. While
Russia and the United States would almost certainly refuse to leave the
key decisions on, for example, questions of disarmament to a court, and
while a court might in any case be ill-equipped to deal with the matter
effectively, both countries have not insisted on pursuing the issue strictly
in a unilateral or two-party context but have agreed to negotiate in a room
full of "neutral" (or "third-party") states. True, the "third-party"
46.

47.

HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 24, at 103.
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states at Geneva and in the General Assembly technically possess no
power to bind either Russia or the United States; yet their presence and
participation has undoubtedly compelled both countries to present more
reasoned, consistent and moderate arguments supported by evidence and
to behave towards the neutral participants almost as to a jury, no matter
how often they might have felt like slamming the book, uttering an oath,
and walking out.
The selectively representative world conference in which a neutral
caucus holds the balance may superficially resemble historic European
congresses in which nations like Britain, France and Russia each in turn
attempted to wield the balance of power. Even though there was a balance of powers at the Congress of Vienna, the resemblance is misleading
because each of the parties was beneficially concerned as an interested
party with each of the issues before the Congress. This is not true of
the neutrals at the disarmament conference. As non-atomic and even
small weapons powers, they have no direct stake in the major issues;
their presence has two entirely different functions. First, it acknowledges
the vested interests of the entire world community in seeing that a peaceful solution is achieved, because the costs of failure would be assessed
against all the nations and not only the disputants. Second, it harnesses
the relative disinterest and impartiality of the neutral states in the process
of devising a settlement. They both judge the cases put forward by the
nuclear powers and add initiatives of their own. It is at once apparent that
such a conference incorporates certain of the advantageous aspects of
the third-party syndrome without submitting to the formal rigidity of
the judicial process.
IV.

CONCLUSION

There is no such thing as an inherently legal or inherently political
dispute-just disputes which have been settled by legal or political
methods. No dispute, if it fails to respond to two-party lawmaking, is
inherently incapable of solution by the third-party method. However,
this is not tantamount to saying that every such dispute can best be settled
by the adversary process of a court of law. Fortunately, a court is not
the only forum in which impartial decision-making can take place. It
cannot be beyond the ingenuity of the international community to emulate the national community by devising more informal or flexible thirdparty decision-making processes to which, in appropriately polycentric
disputes, the parties could themselves repair, or to which they could be
referred by the courts.

